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Abstract	Non-Humean	accounts	of	the	metaphysics	of	nature	posit	either	laws	or	powers	in	order	to	account	for	natural	necessity	and	world-order.	We	argue	that	such	monistic	views	face	fundamental	problems.	On	the	one	hand,	neo-Aristotelians	cannot	give	unproblematic	power-based	accounts	of	the	functional	laws	among	quantities	offered	by	physical	theories,	as	well	as	of	the	place	of	conservation	laws	and	symmetries	in	a	lawless	ontology;	in	order	to	capture	these	characteristics,	commitment	to	governing	laws	is	indispensable.	On	the	other	hand,	ontologies	that	entirely	exclude	some	kind	of	power	ascription	to	worldly	entities	(such	as	primitivism)	face	what	we	call	the	Governing	Problem:	such	ontologies	do	not	have	the	resources	to	give	an	adequate	account	of	how	laws	play	their	governing	role.	We	propose	a	novel	dualist	model,	which,	we	argue,	has	the	resources	to	solve	the	difficulties	encountered	by	its	two	dominant	competitors,	without	inheriting	the	problems	of	either	view.	According	to	the	dualist	model,	both	laws	and	powers	(suitably	conceived)	are	equally	fundamental	and	irreducible	to	each	other,	and	both	are	needed	in	order	to	give	a	satisfactory	account	of	the	nomological	structure	of	the	world.	The	dualist	model	constitutes	thus	a	promising	alternative	to	current	monistic	views	in	the	metaphysics	of	science.		
1	Introduction	For	many	philosophers,	certainly	in	the	seventeenth	century	but	also	in	the	latter	half	of	the	twentieth,	laws	underpin	the	causal	fabric	of	the	world	and	ground	and	explain	the	regularity	there	is	in	it.	They	capture	a	sense	of	necessity	or	inevitability	in	the	workings	of	worldly	entities.	They	are	thus	being	granted	modal	force;	it	is	this	modal	force	which	gives	the	laws	of	nature	their	explanatory	power.	Laws	are	relied	upon	not	only	to	explain	(and	predict)	what	actually	happens,	but	also	to	ground	what	could	or	could	not	have	happened	(by	supporting	relevant	counterfactual	conditionals).1	In	the	recent	literature	in	philosophy	of	science,	however,	there	is	a	call	to	‘dethrone’	
																																																						1	This	tradition	goes	back	to	Descartes	(1982).	For	a	detailed	account	of	this	tradition	and	its	relation	to	the	earlier	dominant	Aristotelianism,	see	Psillos	(2018).	2	We	think,	but	will	not	argue	for	this	now,	that	the	origins	of	this	dualist	model	can	be	found	in	Leibniz’s	mature	(post	1680)	work	and	especially	in	his	critique	of	occasionalism,	which	posited	laws	but	divested	matter	of	all	power.	For	some	preliminary	discussion,	see	Psillos	(2018).	
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laws	as	the	source	of	natural	necessity.	Two	are	the	dominant	tendencies:	either	to	eliminate	laws	altogether	from	scientific	ontology	as	a	relic	of	a	bygone	era,	thereby	denying	them	any	role	in	the	workings	of	nature	(Cartwright	&	Ward	2016);	or	to	grant	them	an	anemic	status	as	mere	side-effects	(or	summaries)	of	the	causal	powers	of	things,	with	laws	playing	no	distinctive	role	of	their	own	(Bird	2007).	Either	way,	on	offer	is	a	lawless	metaphysics	of	nature,	with	causal	powers	occupying	the	place	and	roles	that	laws	of	nature	used	to	play	according	to	the	traditional	view.	The	conception	of	a	law-governed	world	is	thus	eliminated	in	favour	of	the	Aristotelian	idea	that	activity	and	change	in	the	world	are	grounded	in	the	natural	causal	powers	of	worldly	entities	(cf.	Ellis	2001;	Mumford	2004;	Bird	2007;	Marmodoro	2010;	Mumford	&	Anjum	2011;	2018).		In	this	paper	we	will	argue	that	the	lawless	power-based	ontology	offered	by	neo-Aristotelians	faces	a	serious	problem:	a	power-based	ontology	that	posits	no	nomological	connections	among	powers,	does	not	suffice	to	capture	central	aspects	of	laws	as	revealed	by	physical	theories;	in	particular,	neo-Aristotelians	have	great	trouble	giving	power-based	accounts	of	the	functional	laws	among	quantities	offered	by	physical	theories,	of	the	place	of	conservation	laws	and	symmetries	in	a	lawless	ontology,	as	well	as	the	role	of	counterlegals	in	scientific	theorising.	We	will	argue	that,	in	order	to	capture	these	characteristics,	laws	that	govern	(powers)	must	have	a	place	within	a	naturalistic	ontology.	We	will	go	on	to	claim,	however,	that	ontologies	which	do	away	with	some	kind	of	power	ascription	to	worldly	entities,	for	instance	primitivism	about	laws,	do	not	have	the	resources	to	give	an	adequate	account	of	how	laws	play	their	governing	role;	to	do	that,	giving	back	some	power	to	worldly	entities	is	inevitable.	Hence,	we	battle	in	two	fronts:	we	argue	against	the	powerful-but-lawless	account	of	neo-Aristotelians	as	well	as	against	the	lawful-but-powerless	account	of	views	such	as	primitivism.	On	the	positive	side,	we	will	advance	and	defend	a	novel	dualist	model,	according	to	which	positing	both	laws	and	some	kind	of	power	is	necessary	for	an	adequate	account	of	the	nomological	structure	of	the	world,	according	to	which	laws	
govern	the	behaviour	of	worldly	things	and	worldly	things	can	execute	the	laws.2	Hence,	though	this	dualist	model	will	highlight	the	limitations	of	a	power-based	ontology,	it	will	show,	that	there	is	a	role	for	powers,	suitably	understood,	to	play	within	the	metaphysics	of	science.		Here	is	the	road	map.	We	will	start	with	some	preliminary	remarks	that	will	set	the	stage	for	what	follows	(section	2).	Next	(section	3),	we	will	present	our	main	argument	against	neo-Aristotelianism	and	lawless	ontologies	in	general.	In	section	4,	we	will	present	the	main	problem,	the	Governing	Problem,	that,	we	think,	affects	ontologies	that	posit	governing	laws	but	no	powers.	Then,	in	section	5,	we	will	present	the	general	contours	of	our	dualist	model	that	admits	of	both	powers	and	governing	laws	and	defend	it	against	criticism.	Finally,	in	section	6	we	will	compare	our	dualist	model	with	three	recent	views	that	give	a	role	to	both	laws	and	powers	and	argue	that	our	dualist	model	is	to	be	preferred.	
	
2	Powerful	Lawlessness	vs	Lawful	Powerlessness	Not	all	philosophers	agree	that	there	is	necessity	in	nature.	Typically,	neo-Humean	philosophers	deny	that	the	regularity	there	is	in	the	world	is	the	result	of	necessary	connections	among	distinct	existents,	e.g.,	properties	of	particulars.	But	among	those	
																																																						2	We	think,	but	will	not	argue	for	this	now,	that	the	origins	of	this	dualist	model	can	be	found	in	Leibniz’s	mature	(post	1680)	work	and	especially	in	his	critique	of	occasionalism,	which	posited	laws	but	divested	matter	of	all	power.	For	some	preliminary	discussion,	see	Psillos	(2018).	
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who	take	it	that	some	kind	of	necessity	renders	the	world	regular,	there	is	a	fundamental	split	regarding	how	best	to	answer	the	question:	what	is	the	source	of	
natural	necessity?	There	are	those	who	take	it	that	necessary	connections	are	grounded	in	the	properties	of	worldly	entities	conceived	of	as	powers	and	those	who	take	it	that	they	are	grounded	in	laws,	conceived	of	as	governing	the	properties	and	the	particulars	thus	related.			
2.1	Powerful	Lawlessness	Those	philosophers	who	posit	irreducible	powers	(aka	purely	dispositional	properties)	take	it	that	powers	have	modal	force:	they	are	modally-laden	properties.	As	such,	they	are	causally	active	entities,	standing	in	definite	relations	of	entailment,	exclusion	and	production	with	other	powers.	The	identity	of	properties	is	not	fixed	by	any	individuating	factor	such	as	a	quiddity;	rather	it	is	fixed	by	the	network	of	causal	relations	to	other	properties;	and	hence	by	each	power’s	causal	role.	On	this	view,	powers	fix	completely	the	nomic	structure	of	the	world,	the	implication	being	that	laws	are	nothing	over	and	above	the	relations	among	powers.	Some	advocates	of	this	view	(e.g.,	Mumford)	take	it	that,	a	fortiori,	laws	are	nothing:	there	are	no	laws.	Others,	e.g.,	Bird,	take	it	that	laws	flow	directly	from	powers.	Consequently,	laws	are	real	but	not	fundamental	to	our	ontology	because	they	are	fixed	by	powers,	where,	for	Bird	at	least,	the	fixing	is	supervenience:	“laws	are	general	relations	among	properties	that	supervene	on	potencies”	(2007,	200).	At	the	same	time,	“laws	are	no	addition	of	being	beyond	potencies”	(2007,	201).	Laws	fall	in	the	category	of	“supervening	or	non-fundamental	natural	entities”	whereas	potencies	are	“fundamental	natural	entities”	(2007,	202).	The	dominant	view	among	the	friends	of	powers	is	dispositional	essentialism:	properties	have	dispositional	essences	(hence,	properties	are	individuated	by	their	essences,	which	confer	on	their	possessors	certain	powers)	and	laws	are	ontologically	dependent	on	these	essences.	Mumford,	by	the	way,	agrees	that	the	nature	of	properties	is	dispositional	but	denies	that	properties	have	essences;	rather,	their	individuation	is	holistic	(see	his	2004,	123).	We	will	call	the	view	that	puts	the	powers	ahead	of	laws	(with	or	without	laws)	Powerful	Lawlessness3.		
2.2	Lawful	Powerlessness	Those	philosophers	who	posit	laws	as	the	source	of	natural	necessity	take	it	that	laws	govern	their	instances.	They	are	governing	laws.	What	exactly	governing	amounts	to	is	a	controversial	issue,	but	it	involves	at	least	a)	entailment	of	the	corresponding	regularity	and	b)	modal	force:	laws	ground	various	relevant	counterfactuals	such	as	if	there	had	been	an	extra	X,	it	would	have	been	Y.	Typically,	governing	laws	are	taken	to	determine	the	corresponding	regularity	(the	regularity	would	not	be	there,	had	the	law	not	been	there)	and	hence	to	determine	the	course	of	events	occurring	in	the	world.	The	so-called	ADT-approach	(defended	independently	by	Dretske	(1977),	Tooley	(1977)	and	
																																																						3	We	take	Powerful	Lawlessness	to	include	any	view	that	posits	powers	as	fundamental	and	laws	as	derivative	(or	non-existent),	even	if	it	adopts	the	existence	of	categorical	features	(e.g.	spatiotemporal	relations,	cf.	Molnar	2003,	Ellis	2005).	So,	the	problems	Powerful	Lawlessness	faces	and	are	presented	in	this	paper	emerge	both	within	a	dispositional	monistic	framework	with	‘thick’	powers	(which	are	powers	whose	essences	are	‘sensitive’	to	categorical	features	because	they	have	‘absorbed’	the	dependence	of	the	strength	of	power’s	action	on	spatiotemporal	relations),	as	well	as	within	property-dualistic	frameworks,	as	long	as	a)	the	categorical	properties	are	not	fundamental	and	their	role	is	only,	as	Ellis	(2005)	says,	to	set	the	stage	for	the	action	of	powers	and	b)	laws	just	describe	the	action	of	powers.	We	discuss	the	relationship	between	powers	and	spatiotemporal	relations	further	in	section	3.1.	
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Armstrong	(1983))	is	a	characteristic	example	of	the	governing	conception.	The	core	of	this	view	is	that	laws	are	contingent	necessitating	relations	among	universals.	Far	from	being	the	law,	the	regularity	‘All	Fs	are	Gs’	holds	in	the	world	because	the	law	N(F,	G)	holds	and	yields	it,	where	N	is	a	second-order	relation	among	universals	F-ness	and	G-ness	which	somehow	enforces	that	whenever	F-ness	is	instantiated	so	is	G-ness.	Notably,	the	properties	that	stand	in	relation	N	to	each	other	are	categorical	and	hence	non-modal.	The	recently	popular	primitivist	account	of	lawhood	is	another	governing	conception.	Primitivists	take	it	that	laws	are	real,	but	ultimate	and	primitive	constituents	of	reality,	which	hold	with	irreducible	necessity	and	guide	(and	hence	govern)	the	kinematical	and	dynamical	behaviour	of	worldly	entities	(Carroll	1994;	Maudlin	2007).	As	Maudlin	put	it:	“laws	of	nature	stand	in	no	need	of	‘philosophical	analysis’;	they	ought	to	be	posited	as	ontological	bedrock”	(2007,	1).	Despite	the	fact	that	primitivists	are	not	clear	on	the	relation	between	laws	and	properties,	it	is	correct	to	say	that	their	conception	is	governing,	since	the	fundamental	laws	of	temporal	evolution,	for	example,	produce	(and	explain)	whatever	regularity	there	is	in	the	world.	Given	that	all	these	accounts	prioritise	laws	over	properties	and	deny	a	role	to	powers,	we	will	call	them,	(collectively)	Lawful	Powerlessness.		
2.3	Against	Monistic	Views	Both	conceptions,	it	should	be	noted,	admit	the	existence	of	natural	necessity,	but	locate	its	source	differently.	On	the	Powerful	Lawlessness	(PL)	view,	necessity	is	internal:	necessary	relations	supervene	on	the	intrinsic	properties	of	the	related	particulars.	It’s	part	of	the	basic	metaphysical	structure	of	the	universe:	the	nature	of	properties	qua	powers.	On	the	Lawful	Powerlessness	(LP)	view,	these	relations	of	necessitation	are	
external	in	that	they	do	not	supervene	on	the	intrinsic	properties	of	the	related	universals;	they	are	a	(contingent)	add-on.	Still	on	both	accounts,	but	for	different	reasons,	regularities	are	enforced	on	the	world:	when	one	property	is	instantiated	the	other	has	to	be	instantiated	too.	It	should	be	stressed	that	both	of	the	currently	popular	views	about	the	fundamental	structure	of	the	world	are	monistic.	It	has	been	a	general	presupposition	in	the	current	literature	that	appealing	either	only	to	modal	properties	or	only	to	laws	is	sufficient	to	provide	a)	an	adequate	account	of	the	source	of	natural	necessity	and	b)	a	plausible	metaphysical	explanation	of	the	world	order.	In	the	sequel,	we	will	argue	that	both	monistic	approaches	(PL	and	LP)	are	problematic.	This	is	our	main	motivation	to	develop	a	novel,	dualistic	account	in	which	both	powers	and	laws	(properly	analysed)	are	indispensable	parts	for	an	adequate	metaphysical	explanation	of	natural	necessity	and	world	order.	Before	delineating	the	basic	tenets	of	our	own	view,	let	us	review	the	reasons	to	think	that	both	monistic	approaches	are	inadequate.		
3	Powers	Without	Laws?	
3.1	Problems	with	the	Derivation	 	The	first	question	for	the	defenders	of	Powerful	Lawlessness	is	the	following:	can	they	go	beyond	the	slogan	that	laws	‘flow’	from	powers	and	offer	a	more	detailed	account	of	how	laws	are	supposed	to	be	so	derived?	Bird	(2007,	46)	aims	to	provide	such	an	account	by	deriving	a	lawful	regularity	from	the	dispositional	essences	of	properties.	According	to	Bird,	if	P	is	a	fundamental	modal	property	(a	potency	in	Bird’s	terminology)	then	it	is	essentially	and	hence	necessarily	associated	with	a	disposition	to	yield	a	particular	manifestation	M	in	response	to	a	particular	stimulus	S.	Hence,		
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	(CA☐)	☐(D(S,M)x↔Sx☐àMx),	where	CA	is	the	acronym	of	‘conditional	analysis’	and	D(S,M)x’	symbolises	‘x	is	disposed	to	manifest	M	in	response	to	stimulus	S’.		Being	a	potency,	property	P	is	such	that		(DEP)	☐(Px	àD(S,M)x)		That	is,	the	real	essence	of	P	is	its	power	to	give	characteristic	manifestation	M	under	stimulus	conditions	S.		Now,	(CA☐)	and	(DEP)	yield		(I) ☐(Pxà(Sx☐àMx))	 	Assume	a	world	w	in	which	some	object	x	possesses	P	and	in	which	x	also	acquires	stimulus	S.	In	w		 (II) Px	&	Sx.		(I)	and	(II)	yield			(III) Mx		Hence,		 (IV)(Px&Sx)àMx	Hence,		 (V)	∀x	((Px&Sx)àMx)		 That’s	a	neat	derivation	of	a	qualitative	generalisation.	Being	thus,	it	fails	to	show	how	quantitative-mathematical	relations	among	properties	‘flow’	from	their	dispositional	essences.	(V)	above	states	that	the	property	P	and	the	stimulus	S	lead	to	the	manifestation	M,	but	it	does	not	necessarily	capture	the	relation	among	the	three	elements.	In	particular,	it	does	not	capture	the	quantitative	relation	between	the	property	(qua	quantity)	and	its	manifestation.	Hence,	as	Vetter	(2012,	209-15)	pointed	out,	Bird’s	derivation	cannot	actually	describe	physics’	functional	laws	among	quantities.	As	an	example,	she	referred	to	Coulomb’s	law	for	the	interaction	of	point	charged	particles.	Here	is	how	Vetter	(2009,	325)	put	the	point:	“Like	most	(all?)	fundamental	laws	of	physics,	Coulomb’s	Law	states	not	merely	a	relation	between	properties,	but	a	very	special	kind	of	relation	–	namely,	a	mathematical	function	–	between	properties	of	a	very	special	kind	–	namely,	quantities.	(V),	on	the	other	hand,	states	a	much	simpler,	non-mathematical	relation	between	properties	that	look	rather	like	qualities”.	Could	the	advocate	of	dispositional	essentialism	argue	that	powers	are	(fully)	determinate?	That	is,	that	Coulomb’s	law	refers	to	the	power	of	charge	of	specific	value	Q	to	attract	or	repel	other	charges	of	specific	values?	The	‘law’	then	would	be:	Everything	that	has	charge	Q	thus-and-so	and	is	in	specific	distance	r	will	manifest	a	specific	force	F.	But	this	is	not	Coulomb’s	law.	It	is	totally	unclear	what	exactly	all	similar	instances	have	in	common	in	virtue	of	which	they	could	be	taken	to	be	instances	of	Coulomb’s	law.		
	 	 	 6	
	 Vetter	suggests	an	alternative	formulation	of	the	characterisation	of	charge	that	is	open	to	the	dispositional	essentialist:		(I+)	☐	(x	has	charge	e	à	∀	charges	qi	∀distances	ri	(x	is	at	ri	from	qi	☐à	x	exerts	force		Fi	= 𝜀 !!!!!!  	)		 This	reformulation,	as	Vetter	notes,	differs	from	Bird’s	initial	formulation	(I)	in	that	the	stimulus	and	the	manifestation	of	the	disposition	cannot	be	characterised	independently	of	each	other:	if	we	specify	the	manifestation	as	the	force	given	by	Coulomb’s	law,	we	have	to	specify	qi	and	ri,	which	however	are	part	of	the	stimulus.	Vetter’s	suggestion	is	to	understand	(I+)	in	terms	of	a	manifestation	only:	‘the	exertion	of	a	force	that	stands	in	a	certain	correlation	to	certain	features	of	the	environment’	(327).	While	(I+)	has	the	advantage	over	(I)	that	it	can	be	used	to	derive	Coulomb’s	law,	rather	than	instances	of	Coulomb’s	law	(as	in	Bird’s	case),	there	is	a	crucial	problem	with	both	derivations,	and,	we	submit,	with	all	similar	kinds	of	proposed	derivation	of	Coulomb’s	law	as	well	as	other	laws	in	physics	that	specify	relations	among	quantities.	As	Cartwright	and	Pemberton	(2013)	have	noted,	dispositional	essentialists	are	committed	to	the	view	that	(at	least	some)	powers	have	a	‘dense’	causal	profile,	that	is	that	the	power	has	it	within	itself	that	it	will	manifest	itself	in	a	certain	concrete	way	for	each	and	every	value	of	its	manifestation	partners,	where	this	set	of	values	may	be	infinite.	So	for	instance,	if	the	electrostatic	force	Fi	= ε !!!!!!!  	is	the	manifestation	of	charges	given	the	inverse	square	of	the	distance	between	them,	as	in	Coulomb’s	law,	then	the	power	of	the	charge	qi	to	attract	or	repel	other	charges	qj	is	fixed	for	all	values	of	qi	and	qj	and	all	the	values	ri	of	the	distance	between	the	charges,	where	ri	takes	its	value	from	the	interval	 0,∞ .	So,	even	if	adoption	of	(I+)	allows	Coulomb’s	law	to	be	derived	and	shows	how	Coulomb’s	law	is	fixed	by	the	power	of	the	charge,	the	price	to	pay	would	be	quite	steep,	as	such	a	view	of	powers	is	unnecessarily	complex.		Cartwright	and	Pemberton’s	own	suggestion	is	to	think	of	the	manifestation	of	a	power	in	terms	of	a	‘canonical	effect’	or	a	‘contribution’	that	the	power	makes	in	different	circumstances.	Such	a	view	has	the	advantage	of	avoiding	the	complexity	of	the	‘causal	profile’	account.	But	when	we	consider	how	such	a	view	treats	a	law	that	specifies	relations	among	quantities,	such	as	Coulomb’s	law,	the	problem	remains:	what	determines	what	will	happen	in	each	different	situation,	i.e.	how	the	various	contributions	of	the	powers	will	be	combined,	such	as	Coulomb’s	law	will	be	satisfied?	It	would	seem	that	we	need	laws	of	combination	of	the	various	contributions	(for	instance,	the	parallelogram-law	for	the	addition	of	component	forces	or	more	complex	tensorial	laws)	in	order	to	explain	the	occurrence	of	specific	effects.	And	it	seems	that	these	laws,	like	the	conservation	laws	that	we	will	discuss	in	the	next	section,	cannot	flow	from	the	nature	of	powers.	Thus,	the	‘contribution’	view	seems	to	strengthen	our	point	for	the	indispensability	of	laws.4	
																																																						4	Cartwright	and	Pemberton	acknowledge	this,	when	they	say:	“[i]t	might	be	objected	that	the	account	of	powers	we	offer	does	not	eliminate	the	need	for	laws	of	nature	since	it	still	leaves	need	for	rules	of	combination	that	are	independent	of	the	powers	in	nature.	So	that	unlike	some	other	powers	accounts,	we	may	not	have	succeeded	in	getting	governance	back	in	to	nature.	We	concede	that	this	may	be	so.	There	may	be	ways	to	get	rules	for	combining	powers	into	nature	itself	in	a	way	that	fits	a	pure	powers	ontology	and	there	may	not.	This	remains	work	for	the	future”	(2013,	94-95).	Note	also	that	our	point	that	powers	cannot	account	on	their	own	for	the	nomological	structure	of	the	world	holds,	as	far	as	we	
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A	case	such	as	Coulomb’s	law,	then,	gives	rise	to	the	following	questions.	How	does	charge	‘manage’	the	information	that	is	available	to	it?	How	does	it	‘use’	it	so	that	Coulomb’s	law	is	satisfied?	In	other	words,	why	does	it	follow	from	the	fact	that	Coulomb’s	force	is	distance	dependent	that	it	is	inverse-square-of-the-distance	dependent?	And	how	does	the	concrete	charge	happen	to	be	sensitive	to	the	right	kind	of	information	available	in	the	inventory	of	possible	values	in	such	a	way	that	Coulomb’s	law	is	satisfied?	These	are	substantive	questions	which	suggest	the	following	answer:	it	is	because	the	charge’s	behaviour	is	governed	by	Coulomb’s	law	that	the	charge’s	power	to	attract	and	repel	other	charges	is	manifested	in	the	way	it	does	and	not	the	other	way	around.	As	we	shall	show	in	the	next	section,	a	main	problem	with	any	alleged	derivation	of	laws	from	properties	is	that	the	quantitative	relations	among	properties	do	not	rightaway	follow	from	these	properties	being	powers.	More	is	needed,	and	in	particular	laws	are	needed	(e.g.,	conservation	laws)	for	such	a	derivation.			 	
3.2	Problems	with	Conservation	Laws	Let’s	move	on,	then,	to	a	fundamental	problem,	in	our	view,	that	the	advocates	of	PL	face:	can	PL	provide	adequate	metaphysical	explanations	of	all	nomic	notions	used	by	contemporary	science	in	terms	of	modal	properties	and	their	nature?	More	precisely,	can	PL	accommodate	the	cases	of	conservation	laws,	symmetries	and	global	principles?	Our	answer	is	negative	and	in	what	follows	we	offer	some	of	the	main	reasons	that	lead	us	to	that	conclusion	(see	also	Livanios	2017).	Let	us	begin	with	conservation	laws.	It	is	a	fact	about	our	world	that	various	quantities	are	conserved	in	all	interactions;	examples	of	such	quantities	are	mass–energy,	electric	charge,	momentum,	angular	momentum.	It	is	also	well	known	that	contemporary	physical	science	strongly	suggests	that	specific	kinds	of	symmetries	(the	continuous	ones)	are	intimately	related	to	the	conservation	of	these	physical	quantities.	In	particular,	a	famous	theorem	of	Amalie	Emmy	Noether	(1918)	says	that	for	each	continuous	symmetry	of	the	Lagrangian	function	of	a	physical	system	there	is	a	quantity	which	is	conserved	by	its	dynamics.	The	application	of	Noether’s	(first)	theorem	in	the	case	of	various	continuous	symmetries	provides	a	unified	and	non-ad	hoc	explanation	of	the	existence	of	conservation	laws	and	conserved	quantities	in	our	world.		Conservation	laws	pose	at	least	three	significant	challenges	to	PL.	The	first	challenge	is	this.	Take	a	specific	conservation	law,	say	the	conservation	of	electric	charge.	This	law,	like	all	conservation	laws,	holds	for	closed	systems	of	particles,	not	for	individual	particles.	This	leads	to	two	problems	for	Bird’s	derivation.	The	first	problem	is	that	Bird’s	derivation	of	laws	from	dispositional	essences	is	based	on	properties	of	individual	particles	such	as	charge;	but	the	law	of	conservation	of	charge	holds	for	a	
system	of	particles,	rather	than	for	individual	particles.	It	seems	then	that	Bird,	and	proponents	of	PL	in	general,	face	the	problem	of	how	to	actually	derive	conservation	laws	from	the	essences	of	properties	of	individual	things.	The	second	problem	is	that	conservation	laws	holds	for	closed	systems	of	particles	and	the	only	closed	system	of	particles	is	the	whole	world,	not	individual	particles.	To	address	the	second	problem,	a	natural	maneuver	of	the	advocates	of	PL	is	to	offer	an	account	that	appeals	to	the	nature	of	the	whole	world.	According	to	one	version	of	this	account	(Bigelow	et	al.	1992),	our	world	is	the	unique	actual	member	of	a	natural	kind	whose	real	essence	requires	conservation	of	
																																																																																																																																																																								can	see,	regardless	of	how	one	views	the	manifestation	of	a	power	in	ontological	terms	(e.g.	as	an	event,	state	of	affairs	or	process).			
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certain	quantities;	in	other	words,	conservation	laws	‘flow’	from	the	kind-essence	of	the	actual	world.	Bigelow	et	al.,	most	probably	in	order	to	avoid	the	accusation	of	ad	hocness,	appeal	to	the	world-as-one-of-a-kind	view	to	provide	a	covering	explanation	for	the	emergence	of	all	laws	of	nature.	They	claim	that,	if	conservation	laws	arise	out	of	the	essence	of	the	whole	world,	and	granting	that	conservation	laws	differ	from	the	other	ones	only	in	scope,	then	other	laws	(concerning	parts	of	the	world)	must	also	arise	out	of	the	world-essence.	Moreover,	they	suggest	that	the	essences	of	parts	of	the	world,	and	the	connections	which	depend	on	them,	may	both	contribute	to	the	world-essence;	and	only	insofar	as	they	do	that,	can	laws	of	nature	arise	out	of	them	(cf.	1992,	386–7).	Yet,	if	that	is	true,	the	world-essence	explanation	is	at	least	redundant	as	far	as	the	case	of	non-conservation	laws	is	concerned.	Since	Bigelow	et	al.	have	presumably	already	provided	an	explanation	of	non-conservation	laws	as	emanating	from	particular	kind-essences,	what	more	(besides,	of	course,	escaping	the	ad	hoc-ness	charge)	can	the	global,	coarse-grained,	explanation	in	terms	of	the	world-essence	offer?		Another	version	of	the	view	under	consideration	is	provided	by	Bird	(2007,	213–4).	He	suggests	(without	finally	endorsing)	that	conservation	laws	could	‘flow’	from	the	dispositional	essence	of	the	property	being	a	world	which	the	actual	world	definitely	instantiates.	This	metaphysical	explanation,	however,	is	either	ad	hoc	or	poor.	It	is	ad	hoc	if	the	property	being	a	world	is	posited	only	in	order	to	explain	conservation	facts.	For	the	actual	world	must	have	the	property	of	being	a	world	with	conservation	laws,	that	is	a	world	like	ours!	But	suppose	that	positing	the	property	of	being	a	world	is	meant	to	provide	an	explanation	of	all	worldly	facts.	It	would	then	be	a	poor	explanation	since	it	would	not	be	fine-grained	explanation	of	the	various	types	of	laws	that	obtain	in	the	world.			 The	second	challenge	is	this:	how	can	the	advocates	of	PL	provide	a	plausible	unified	metaphysical	explanation	of	the	phenomenon	of	conservation	in	general	if	they	were	to	reject	(for	the	reasons	given	above)	the	accounts	offered	by	Bigelow	et	al.,	and	Bird?	The	problem	is	that	conservation	applies	to	many	different	physical	properties	that	seem	to	have	nothing	in	common	except	of	the	‘feature’	of	being	a	physical	property.	So,	if	we	reject	a	world-nature	that	in	a	sense	can	unify	the	various	conservation	laws,	it	is	not	clear	on	what	grounds	(that	is,	on	the	nature	of	which	property)	can	the	advocates	of	PL	provide	a	bottom-up	explanation	of	the	phenomenon	of	conserved	quantities.			Lastly,	there	is	a	third,	and	more	general,	challenge	that	conservation	laws	pose	for	PL-ists.	Consider	an	interaction	between	two	charged	particles.	Since	charge	is	conserved,	the	characterisation	of	such	an	interaction	requires	a	relevant	conservation	law.	So,	given	that	the	conservation	law	does	not	‘flow’	from	the	essence	of	charge	(which,	as	characterised	by	the	dispositional	essentialist	is	a	property	of	individual	particles),	nor	from	the	essence	of	the	relevant	natural	kind	(as	Bigelow	et	al.	acknowledge),	the	behaviour	of	the	charged	particles	is	grounded	on	two	things:	the	dispositional	essence	of	charge	(assuming	that	it	has	one)	and	the	law	of	conservation	of	charge.5		That’s	a	key	point.	For	whether	or	not	we	accept	the	further	claim	that	conservation	laws	‘flow’	from	the	world-essence,	it	follows	forcefully	that	these	laws	have	a	governing	
																																																						5	The	intertwinement	of	interaction	laws	with	conservation	laws	can	be	also	brought	to	the	fore	by	the	approximate	conservation	of	flavour	quantum	numbers	of	elementary	particles.	It	is	well	known	that	quantum	numbers	such	as	strangeness,	charm	or	beauty	that	characterise	types	of	elementary	particles	are	preserved	under	strong	and	electromagnetic	interactions,	but	not	under	weak	interaction.	This	fact	clearly	suggests	that	a	complete	characterisation	of,	say,	strong	interaction	and	its	differences	with	weak	interaction	cannot	be	provided	without	reference	to	the	conservation	laws	of	those	quantum	numbers.	
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function:	it	affects	the	nature	of	particular	interactions	of	charged	particles.	This	can	only	be	an	admission	of	defeat	by	the	PL-ists:	governing	laws	crop	up	again.	The	advocates	of	PL	have	to	abandon	one	key	tenet	of	their	views,	viz.,	that	powers	are	the	sole	source	of	natural	necessity	and	that	therefore,	there	is	no	other	entity	over	and	above	those	powers,	which	is	able	to	‘direct’	powers	(and	hence	objects)	in	what	to	do.			
3.3	Problems	with	Symmetries	The	case	of	fundamental	symmetries	is	equally	disturbing	for	PL.	Symmetries	posit	
extra	constraints	upon	the	behaviour	of	properties	beyond	those	posited	by	their	dispositional	nature.	This	is	at	odds	with	PL.	Actually,	PL	can	be	saved	either	by	insisting	that	symmetry	principles	are	merely	epistemic	features	of	the	ways	humans	represent	the	world	or	by	embracing	the	view	that	they	are	concerned	with	the	essential	properties	of	the	kind	of	world	we	live	in.	The	first	option	is	adopted	by	Bird,	who	concludes	that	“the	dispositional	essentialist	ought	to	regard	symmetry	principles	as	pseudo-laws”	and	that	“symmetry	principles	and	conservation	laws	will	be	eliminated	as	being	features	of	our	form	of	representation	rather	than	features	of	the	world	requiring	to	be	accommodated	within	our	metaphysics”	(Bird	2007,	214).	This	first	option	would	be	plausible	had	the	sole	role	of	symmetry	principles	been	to	impose	constraints	upon	the	physical	properties.	However,	that	is	not	actually	the	case.	The	application	of	symmetry	principles	has	a	much	wider	scope,	and	that	is	a	fact	which	in	some	cases	grounds	powerful	arguments	in	favour	of	an	ontological	interpretation	of	symmetries	–	consider,	for	instance,	the	role	of	symmetry	principles	in	the	prediction	of	previously	unknown	elementary	particles.6	A	well-known	example	is	the	prediction	of	Ω−	particle	via	the	eightfold	way,	an	organisational	scheme	for	hadrons.	This	scheme	is	a	consequence	of	flavor	symmetries	between	various	kinds	of	quarks	and	its	application	to	the	spin-3/2	baryons	yields	a	classification	in	a	form	of	a	decuplet.	Famously,	one	of	the	particles	of	this	decuplet,	Ω−,	had	never	been	previously	observed	when	the	eightfold	way	was	proposed.	This	particle	was	actually	observed	in	1964	by	a	particle	accelerator	group	at	Brookhaven.	Now,	the	second	option	leads	to	the	same	difficulties	as	the	case	of	conservation	laws.	Here	again,	the	advocate	of	PL	would	argue	that	symmetries	characterise	the	world	as	one-of-a-kind.	By	the	same	token,	our	reply	will	be	similar	too.	If	the	advocates	of	PL	give	a	power-based	explanation	of	symmetries,	such	an	explanation	should	have	the	following	form:	something	governs	or	constrains	the	behaviour	of	properties.	But	this	is	in	essence	to	buy	into	a	‘governing’	conception,	thereby	in	effect	abandoning	PL.7		
3.4	Problems	with	Laws	Insofar	as	they	allow	laws	at	all,	the	advocates	of	PL	hold	that	all	worlds	with	the	same	natural	properties	as	the	actual	one,	have	the	actual	laws	as	well.	So,	for	them,	laws	are	metaphysically	necessary.	This	kind	of	metaphysical	necessity	seems	to	be	offered	for	free,	since	it	follows	from	the	criterion	of	identity	of	properties	in	combination	with	the	claim	that	laws	are	just	summaries	of	the	causal	profile	of	properties.	Now,	there	are	
																																																						6	There	is	more	that	could	be	said	about	symmetries	and	conservation	laws	in	relation	to	power	ontologies;	the	purpose	of	sections	3.2	and	3.3	is	to	highlight	some	salient	problems	and	sum	up	work	that	has	been	published	elsewhere,	which,	for	reasons	of	space,	cannot	be	fully	recited	here.	The	interested	reader	should	look	at	Chakravartty	(2019),	French	(2014)	and	Livanios	(2010;	2018).	7	The	existence	of	fundamental	constants	poses	an	additional	significant	threat	to	a	power-based	ontology.	In	the	interest	of	space,	we	do	not	discuss	this	issue	here	but	refer	the	reader	to	Livanios	(2014),	for	a	detailed	account.	
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powerful	intuitions	for	the	metaphysical	contingency	of	laws.	Be	that	as	it	may,	the	problem	is	that	the	alleged	metaphysical	necessity	of	laws	stands	in	some	cases	in	contrast	to	actual	scientific	practice.	Scientists	often	appeal	to	counterfactuals	having	antecedents	opposed	to	actual	laws	or	counterfactuals	having	antecedents	that	contain	laws	in	which	fundamental	constants	(which	current	physics	cannot	fully	determine)	take	on	values	that	differ	from	the	actual	ones.	But	if	there	are	no	law-violating	possibilities,	then	counterlegals	will	be	vacuously	true.	It	is,	to	say	the	least,	not	clear	how	vacuously	true	propositions	can	have	any	impact	in	actual	scientific	work.	Given	that	the	above	do	have	an	impact	in	scientists’	thought,	it	seems	that	there	is	a	tension	here	between	PL’s	commitments	and	scientific	practice.	Hence,	a	burden	on	PL-ists	is	to	develop	an	alternative	account	of	the	semantics	of	counterfactuals	that	secures	that	counterlegals	are	not	vacuously	true	(see	Ellis	1999;	Handfield	2004).		 To	recap:	the	difficulties	posed	to	Powerful	Lawlessness	(from	the	existence	of	functional	laws	among	quantities,	conservation	laws,	symmetries,	and	the	function	of	counterlegals	in	scientific	practice)	show	that	not	only	is	there	no	special	need	to	metaphysically	interpret	basic	scientific	concepts	in	terms	of	sui	generis	modal	properties	but	also	that	positing	only	them	(at	the	expense	of	laws)	is	not	enough	to	ground	illuminating	analyses	of	laws	and	principles	that	have	an	extremely	significant	role	in	science.	Furthermore,	it	seems	that	laws,	qua	entities	distinct	from	powers	that	are	nonetheless	able	to	govern	them,	are	indispensable	for	the	explanation	of	various	facts	concerning	modal	properties	themselves,	as	will	be	explained	more	fully	in	the	next	sections.				
4	Laws	Without	Powers?		We	have	seen	that	Powerful	Lawlessness	faces	significant	problems.	Given	the	importance	of	conservation	laws,	symmetries,	constants	and	functional	laws	in	current	physical	theory,	we	have	good	reasons	to	accept	laws	of	nature	as	fundamental	items	in	our	ontology,	distinct	from	powers	of	things.	Does	this	mean	that	we	should	embrace	some	form	of	Lawful	Powerlessness	and	eliminate	powers	altogether?	We	are	now	going	to	argue	that	such	powerless	ontologies	face	a	fundamental	difficulty:	without	powers,	it	is	not	clear	at	all	how	governing	laws	can	play	their	role.		
4.1	From	the	Inference	Problem	to	the	Governing	Problem	The	Inference	Problem,	which	was	originally	posed	by	van	Fraassen	(1989)	and	constitutes	perhaps	the	most	discussed	difficulty	faced	by	non-Humean	accounts	of	laws	of	nature,	is	this.	Any	conception	of	laws	must	show	how	there	is	a	valid	inference	from	the	laws	there	are	to	the	regularities	that	hold	in	the	world.	Humean	accounts	of	lawhood	do	not	face	this	problem,	since	laws	are,	ultimately,	regularities.	But	all	those	non-Humeans	accounts	which	make	laws	distinct	from	regularities	should	show	how	regularities	can	be	recovered.	In	other	words,	it	should	be	shown	how	we	get	from	‘It	is	a	Law	that	P’	to	the	relevant	regularity.	For	instance,	in	the	ADT-approach,	how	can	an	atomic	second-order	fact	(e.g.	the	holding	of	the	nomic	necessitation	N	between	universals	F	and	G)	determine	a	first-order	general	fact	(the	regularity	that	for	each	object	x,	if	x	is	F	then	x	is	G)?	Or	take	primitivism.	If,	as	Maudlin	says,	“[l]aws	are	ontological	primitives	at	least	in	that	two	worlds	could	differ	in	their	laws	but	not	in	any	observable	respect”	(2007,	17),	how	can	we	go	from	the	laws	there	are	in	the	world	to	the	regularities?	This	problem	has	been	thoroughly	discussed	(see,	for	example	Sider	1992,	Armstrong	1993,	Pages	2002,	Hildebrand	2013,	Schaffer	2016);	nevertheless,	in	our	
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view,	there	are	still	aspects	of	it	that	are	largely	unexplored.8	One	of	these	aspects	regards	the	fact	that	it	is	only	by	governing	the	properties	that	non-Humean	laws	yield	the	regularities.	That	is	most	clearly	seen	in	the	ADT	version,	but	it	holds	in	primitivism	as	well.	Once	we	realise	that	laws	govern	worldly	things	through	their	properties,	a	fundamental	question	naturally	comes	to	mind:	how	do	laws	‘tell’	properties	what	to	do?	Differently	put,	why	are	certain	properties	apt	to	be	related	by	nomic	relations?	A	deep	answer	to	the	Inference	Problem	requires	a	prior	answer	to	this	question.	For	only	given	that	properties	are	‘told’	what	to	do	by	the	nomic	relation,	can	we	proceed	to	metaphysically	explain	how	the	behaviour	of	particulars	characterised	by	the	thus	related	properties	can	be	determined	(or,	in	other	words,	how	actual	regularities	are	generated).	We	call	the	difficulty	related	to	the	above	question	the	Governing	Problem	for	non-Humean	laws.	To	see	the	Governing	Problem	in	action,	let	us	look	briefly	at	the	Maxwell–Faraday	law	of	induction	∇×E=-∂B/∂t	(E	and	B	are	the	electric	field	strength	and	the	magnetic	field	strength,	respectively).	On	this	law,	a	time-varying	magnetic	field	will	always	accompany	a	spatially	varying	electric	field,	and	vice	versa.	A	solution	to	the	Governing	Problem	requires	an	answer	to	the	following	question:	how	does	the	Maxwell-Faraday	law	‘tell’	E	and	B	(construed	as	properties	of	the	electromagnetic	field	at	each	point)	what	to	do?	After	we	have	metaphysically	explained	how	the	nomic	relation	embodied	in	the	Maxwell-Faraday	law	manages	to	determine	how	E	and	B	behave,	that	we	can	proceed	to	metaphysically	explain	how	the	Maxwell-Faraday	law	can	determine	that	in	any	electric	generator,	the	varying	magnetic	field	created	by	a	rotating	bar	magnet	invariably	accompanies	an	electric	field	in	a	nearby	wire.		
4.2	ADT-laws	vs	Primitive	Laws	How	do	extant	versions	of	LP	fare	with	solving	the	Governing	Problem?	As	far	as	ADT	theories	are	concerned,	no	satisfactory	solution	has	been	offered.	Any	attempt	at	a	solution	is	a	‘brute	fact’	one.	The	law-making	property	N	is	contingent;	it	just	happens	to	obtain	and	to	relate	these	and	not	other	properties.	It	should	be	clear	that	a	necessary	step	for	a	fair	solution	of	the	Governing	Problem	requires	an	ontic	account	of	the	nomic	necessitation	relation.	ADT	theorists	have	either	tried	to	identify	N	(for	example	Armstrong	(1993,	422)	suggested	that	is	actually	the	causal	relation	at	the	type-level)	or	to	posit	it	as	a	theoretical	entity	that	fulfils	a	specific	nomic	role	(Tooley	1987).	Each	of	these	options,	however,	faces	its	own	problems.	For	instance,	as	regards	the	first	option,	it	is	not	clear	whether	Armstrong’s	identification	accommodates	all	kinds	of	laws	(are	all	laws	causal?)	or	even	whether	the	entity	with	which	the	identification	is	made	exists	or	not	(does	causation	exist	at	the	fundamental	level	or	is	it	a	‘folk’	derivative	notion?).	While	the	second	option	faces	the	problem	of	multiple	realisation	of	the	definitional	role	by	different	entities.		A	different	kind	of	problem	that	besets	the	ADT	conception	of	laws	is	that	it	is	by	and	large	qualitative.	Although	one	might	point	out	that	the	core	idea	behind	ADT	is	certainly	science-informed,	as	laws	on	this	view	are	relations	between	natural	properties,	the	theory	is	often	presented	by	simple	toy-examples	rather	than	actual	
																																																						8	It	is	important	to	note	that	there	exist	strong	reasons	to	think	that	the	Inference	Problem	equally	besets	those	versions	of	PL	according	to	which	the	nature	of	modal	properties	is	relationally	constituted	by	second-order	stimulus-response	relations.	As	Barker	and	Smart	(2012)	argue,	on	those	versions	of	PL	what	does	the	governing	is	not	the	first-order	instantiations	of	properties	but	the	aforementioned	second-order	relational	facts.	In	that	case,	however,	PL’s	explanation	of	governing	does	not	significantly	differ	from	Armstrong’s	account	of	governing	in	terms	of	the	nomic	necessitation	relation	and	therefore	PL	inherits	the	Inference	Problem	from	LP.	
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scientific	laws	which	are	typically	complex	and	in	mathematical	and	quantitative	form.	To	be	sure,	Armstrong	(1983)	has	made	an	effort	to	bring	his	account	nearer	to	actual	scientific	cases.	Yet,	it	is	not	clear	whether	ADT	(based,	as	it	is,	on	a	few	kinds	of	nomic	relations—nomic	necessitation,	nomic	probabilification,	and	perhaps	nomic	exclusion)	can	capture	the	complexity	of	scientific	laws.	How	about	primitivism	then?	Does	it	offer	a	solution	for	the	Governing	Problem?	Primitivism	about	laws	takes	it	that	laws	are	real,	but	ultimate	and	primitive	constituents	of	reality,	which	hold	with	irreducible	necessity	and	guide	the	kinematical	and	dynamical	behaviour	of	worldly	entities	(Carroll	1994;	Lange	2009;	Maudlin	2007)9.	So,	primitivism	tries	to	solve	the	Governing	Problem	by	taking	the	modal	force	of	laws,	and	thus	their	governing	role,	as	given.	But,	by	insisting	that	laws	are	sui	generis	entities,	primitivism	fails	to	give	an	illuminating	account	about	how	laws	‘guide’	the	behaviour	of	worldly	things.	Carroll	(1987,	267),	for	instance,	denies	that	law-statements	have	truth-makers,	and	refrains	from	any	further	analysis	of	the	supposed	facts	(either	nomic	or	non-nomic)	that	are	the	truth-makers	of	laws.	All	he	says	is	the	following:	P	is	a	law	of	nature	if	and	only	if	P	is	a	regularity	that	holds	because	of	nature.	Hence,	“[l]awhood	requires	that	nature	itself–understood	as	distinct	from	anything	in	nature	or	the	absence	of	something	from	nature–make	the	regularity	true”.	That,	we	submit,	is	totally	unilluminating.	For	one,	all	laws	are	‘made	true’	by	nature.	But	which	laws	and	why	are	made	true	thus?	For	another,	Armstrong	once	said	that	we	must	admit	the	existence	of	nomic	necessity	“in	the	spirit	of	natural	piety”	(1983,	92).	Yet,	he	went	on	to	say	a	lot	more	by	way	of	analysis.	Carroll’s	treatment	of	nomic	necessity	as	primitive	just	calls	us	to	be	pious,	without	even	trying	to	explain	to	us	why	we	should.10	The	Governing	Problem	is	then	a	challenge	inherent	in	all	versions	of	LP,	and	is	extremely	important	from	a	metaphysical	point	of	view:	LP	seems	unable	to	provide	a	metaphysical	account	of	how	and	why	properties	are	governed	(in	the	sense	explained	
																																																						9	Marc	Lange	(2009)	has	developed	the	view	that	laws	are	maximal	sets	of	principles	which	are	invariant-under-counterfactual-interventions,	but	since	he	takes	counterfactuals	as	having	a	primitive	modal	force,	his	view	could	be	taken	as	a	variant	of	primitivism.	10	Ontic	structuralists	offer	yet	another	version	of	LP.	Structuralism	reconceptualises	laws	as	being	the	ultimate	structural	features	of	reality	grounded	in	determinable	relations,	where	relations	are	understood	as	not	being	dependent	on	the	first-order	properties	of	objects	(Ladyman	&	Ross	2007;	French	2014).	Ontic	structuralism	then	does	away	with	properties	as	fundamental	and	recovers	them	from	relations.	In	particular,	properties	are	recovered	from	the	relations	embodied	in	the	laws.	Objects	too,	insofar	as	they	are	allowed	in	some	sense,	depend	on	laws.	As	French	sums	it	up:	“the	purported	objects	are	dependent	on	the	structures	(and	here	the	role	of	symmetries	in	presenting	that	dependence	is	fundamental)	and	the	properties	are	dependent	on	the	laws	themselves”	(2014,	302).	The	relation	of	metaphysical	dependence	that	French	favours,	is	the	relation	between	determinable	and	determinates:	“(…)	the	nature	of	the	dependence	between	the	structure	and	kinds,	properties,	and	putative	‘objects’	(e.g.	elementary	particles)	is	shaped,	or	fleshed	out,	by	the	relationship	between	determinables	and	determinates”	(2014,	290).	Laws	themselves	are	“relation-determinables”	(2014,	283)	and	as	such	they	yield	“determinate	instances	of	these	properties”.	We	are	not	going	to	discuss	here	the	idea	for	laws	as	relation-determinables	(for	reasons	to	be	skeptical	with	this	view	see	Psillos	(2016)).	For	our	purposes,	the	main	question	is	whether	there	is	conceptual	space	within	structuralism	for	a	notion	of	‘governing’.	For	Cei	&	French,	for	example,	in	structuralism	the	‘governing	metaphor’	is	replaced	by	the	relation	of	metaphysical	dependence.	But	in	view	of	such	a	dependence,	it	does	not	seem	to	be	meaningful	to	ask	how	the	structure	governs	the	properties.	And	yet,	Cei	and	French	admit	that	“there	is	still	a	kind	of	governance	(…)	in	that	the	behaviour	of	entities,	both	unobservable,	such	as	electrons,	and	observable	such	as	chairs,	can	be	thought	of	as	‘governed’	by	the	relevant	laws”	(2010,	37).	As	the	resulting	view	of	the	structuralist	account	of	laws	is	far	from	clear,	and	in	particular	as	it	is	not	clear	whether	structuralists	adopt	a	genuine	concept	of	governing	(given	their	thesis	of	metaphysical	dependence	of	entities	and	properties	on	the	structure),	we	will	not	discuss	this	view	further	here.	
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earlier)	by	laws.	It	seems	that	without	at	least	some	‘thin’	power	to	be	nomically	governed,	no	properties	can	actually	have	a	causal/nomic	role	and	consequently	particular	things	seem	really	powerless	to	follow	any	laws.	Our	view,	then,	is	that	we	can	offer	a	robust	solution	to	the	Governing	Problem	by	admitting	that	a)	properties	have	generic,	but	ontologically	‘thin’,	powers	to	be	related	by	nomic	relations;	and	b)	nomic	relations	are	relata-specific.		In	the	next	section	we	will	develop	such	a	view,	which	we	call	the	Dualist	Model	(henceforth,	DM).	In	advancing	DM,	both	kinds	of	problems	faced	by	PL	and	LP,	i.e.	the	difficulties	of	reconciling	lawless	ontologies	with	central	features	of	current	physical	theory	and	the	inability	of	powerless	ontologies	to	give	a	satisfactory	account	of	the	governing	role	of	laws	of	nature,	will	be	solved	by	taking	the	radical	stance	that	our	scientific	ontology	should	be	both	lawful	and	powerful.	But	this	solution	requires	that	scientific	ontology	rests	on	two	independent	pillars:	both	laws	and	powers	feature	as	distinct	ontological	items.		
5	A	Unified	Model	of	Laws	and	Powers	As	noted	already,	DM	is	directly	motivated	by	the	problems	faced	by	PL	and	LP	outlined	above.	Our	key	idea	is	that	natural	necessity	has	a	double	source:	both	governing	laws	and	minimally	powerful	properties	are	responsible	for	the	natural	necessity	and	the	order	that	characterise	the	phenomena	of	our	world:	governing	laws	require	taking	properties	to	be	(in	a	sense	to	be	specified)	minimally	powerful	(and	hence	governable),	while	powers	require	laws	to	have	their	quantitative	relations	fixed.			
5.1	Thick	vs	Thin	Powers	Why	are	laws	required,	even	though	there	are	powers?	We	have	already	argued	that	insofar	as	there	are	conserved	quantities	in	the	worldly	phenomena,	they	are	governed	by	conservation	laws,	which	cannot	be	reduced	to	the	powers	of	natural	substances.	And	exactly	the	same	holds	for	symmetries	in	the	world.		 But	there	is	another	reason	why	we	need	laws,	even	if	we	assume	powers:	powers,	on	their	own,	cannot	fix	the	functional	relations	among	properties.	Friends	of	powers	just	assume	that	the	powers	properties	have	are	fully	specific,	viz.,	they	fix	the	exact	quantitative	relations	among	properties.	But	there	is	no	good	reason	to	think	like	this.	To	fix	our	ideas,	let	us	think	of	mass	in	the	classical-Newtonian	world.	Newton	showed	that	gravitational	force	depends	on	(is	a	function	of)	mass	and	distance:	it’s	proportional	to	the	masses	of	the	gravitating	bodies	and	inversely	proportional	to	their	distance.	In	other	words,	Newton	showed	that	a	piece	of	matter	has	a	power	to	attract	another	piece	of	matter	in	relation	to	its	mass.	We	could	then	say	that	mass	has	the	power	to	attract	mass.	But	why	should	we	assume	that	this	power	is	such	that	it	yields,	necessarily,	the	exact	relation	of	inverse-square	of	the	distance	r	between	two	masses?	Would	the	attractive	power	of	mass	be	different	had	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	been	different?	It	seems	perfectly	OK	to	say	that	mass	would	still	have	the	power	to	attract	other	masses,	had	the	relation	been	inversely	proportional	to	some	other	power	of	the	distance.	In	fact,	this	is	evinced	by	the	case	of	the	anomalous	perihelion	of	Mercury.	Asaph	Hall,	in	1894,	had	suggested	that	a	replacement	of	1⁄r2	with	1⁄r2+λ,	where	λ	stands	for	a	small	number,	was	sufficient	to	explain	the	anomalous	perihelion	motion	of	Mercury.	But	this	revision	led	to	conflicts	with	other	phenomena,	such	as	the	position	of	the	Lunar	apogee.	The	point	here	is	simply	that	had	this	revision	been	correct,	that	is,	had	the	law-like	connection	between	gravitational	force	and	masses	been	different,	masses	would	still	have	the	power	to	attract	each	other.	What	
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would	have	changed	would	have	been	the	exact	quantitative	relation	among	the	relevant	properties.			 In	light	of	this,	we	may	then	discern	two	possible	grades	of	modal	strength	of	mass:			 	
• Necessarily,	mass	confers	on	the	objects	that	possess	it	the	disposition	to	attract	other	massive	objects	with	the	exact	mathematical	form	of	attraction	determined	by	Newton’s	gravitation	law.		
• Necessarily,	mass	confers	on	the	objects	that	possess	it	the	disposition	to	attract	other	massive	objects.		 The	difference	between	the	two	grades	is	very	important.	Let	us,	for	simplicity,	refer	to	the	power	of	mass	(as	opposed	to	the	powers	of	massive	particulars)	and	note	that	the	two	grades	above	attribute	different	powers	to	mass.	On	the	first	option,	the	attractive	power	of	mass	is	fully	specific;	the	power	is	such	that	the	functional	relationship	that	masses	enter	into	with	other	masses	is	fully	determined	by	the	power.	This,	roughly	put,	is	the	view	of	those	who	think	that	laws	‘flow’	from	powers.	Let’s	call	these	powers	thick.	On	the	second	option,	mass	has	indeed	a	power,	but	it	is	thin.	It’s	not	enough	on	its	own	to	fix	the	quantitative	relations	it	stands	to	other	masses.	What	is	also	required	for	this	is	laws	and	specific	(contingent)	nomic	relations.	Hence	on	the	second	option	mass	has	a	thin	power	which	in	tandem	with	a	nomic	relation	(e.g.,	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	in	the	actual	world)	attracts	other	masses	with	an	exact	mathematical	form	of	attraction	determined	by	the	contingent	nomic	web	of	each	possible	world	in	which	it	exists.	To	put	the	point	with	a	bit	more	precision,	mass	confers	on	the	objects	that	possess	it	the	generic	disposition	to	attract	other	massive	objects	but	the	exact	functional/mathematical	form	of	the	relation	to	which	massive	objects	stand	(i.e.,	Newton’s	gravitation	law)	is	determined	by	a	web	of	laws.	The	first	option	above,	which	is	adopted	by	PL-ists,	is,	we	think,	wrong-headed.	If	mass	had	such	a	thick	power,	it	would	by	itself	confer	the	completely	determined	disposition	of	attraction	on	the	massive	objects	and	Newton’s	law	would	be	metaphysically	redundant.	And	though	this	might	sound	appealing	to	some	friends	of	powers,	we	have	already	seen	that	such	a	view	is	untenable	given	a)	the	problems	with	deriving	the	functional	laws	from	the	powers	of	individual	objects,	and	b)	the	fact	that	the	all-important	conservation	laws	cannot	be	‘flowing’	out	of	powers	of	individual	objects.	Indeed,	in	Newton’s	case,	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	does	not	‘flow’	directly	from	the	power	of	mass	to	attract	other	masses.	More	is	needed;	for	instance,	the	law	for	the	force	in	uniform	circular	motion	as	well	as	Newton’s	third	law.		 Why	do	we	take	it	that	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	is	itself	a	nomic	relation	in	which	masses	enter?	It	is	a	nomic	relation	because	it	is	fixed	by	other	laws.	In	the	case	of	Newtonian	gravity,	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	is	fixed	by	the	three	laws	of	motion	together	with	Kepler’s	harmonic	law.	In	a	possible	world	in	which	Newton’s	laws	of	motion	do	not	hold,	the	centripetal	forces	would	have	different	measures.	Similarly,	in	a	world	in	which	Newton’s	three	laws	hold,	but	where	the	harmonic	law	didn’t,	centripetal	forces	would	have	different	measures;	hence	masses	would	not	stand	in	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	with	each	other	and	with	the	centripetal	force.	It	is	our	contention	that	gravity	satisfies	Newton’s	law	in	the	specific	quantitative	way	it	does	in	virtue	of	a)	the	generic	power	mass	has	to	attract	other	masses	and	b)	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	nomic	relation.	DM,	then,	adopts	the	second	option,	above.		
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Now,	some	care	is	needed	here.	For	the	second	option	itself	(if	construed	as	the	negation	of	the	view	that	powers	are	thick)	bifurcates	into	two	versions:	let’s	call	them	‘light’	and	‘ultra-light’.	The	ultra-light	version	would	have	it	that	properties	are	powerful	only	in	the	sense	of	having	the	power	of	being	governable	by	a	law	(any	law).	When	it	comes	to	Newton’s	law,	for	instance,	it	might	be	that	the	power	mass	has	is	simply	its	receptivity	to	be	governed	by	(Newton’s)	law.	On	this	view,	mass	(alongside	other	properties)	is	apt	to	be	law-governed	and	that’s	where	anything	powerful	in	it	ends.	All	the	rest	is	done	by	laws.		On	the	‘light’	version,	the	powers	properties	have	are	still	thin	(they	don’t	fix	the	laws)	but	quite	substantive.	On	this	view,	for	instance,	mass	is	a	powerful	property,	though	minimally	so;	i.e.	it	does	confer	on	objects	possessing	it	a	generic	‘attractability’,	even	though	it	cannot	by	itself	confer	on	the	object	a	fully	determined	and	quantified	disposition	of	attraction.	Both	of	these	options	need	exploring.	In	the	sequel,	we	shall	adopt	the	latter	and	explore	it	(hence,	we	shall	leave	exploring	the	ultra-light	option	for	some	other	occasion).		According,	then,	to	DM,	and	given	the	light	version	above,	nomic	relations	are	indispensable	parts	of	the	complete	grounds	of	the	lawful	behaviour	of	objects.	We	take	such	a	view	to	offer	the	most	satisfactory	account	of	the	particular	example	of	gravity	in	Newton’s	theory,	and	to	be	motivated	by	the	problems	we	have	seen	with	the	monistic	views.		
5.2	Thin	Powers	and	Nomic	Relations	But	why	are	powers	required,	even	though	there	are	laws	and	nomic	relations?	Part	of	our	point	is	dialectical:	if	you	start	out	as	a	dispositionalist,	then	we	have	provided	what	we	see	as	strong	reasons	to	think	that	powers	are	not	enough	to	fix	the	nomological	order	in	the	world;	and	hence,	to	accept	further	elements—what	we	called	nomic	relations—in	your	ontology	which	contribute	indispensably	to	fixing	the	laws.	By	the	same	token,	if	you	start	out	as	a	primitivist	or	an	ADT-theorist,	that	is,	if	you	reject	powers	as	an	element	in	your	ontology	while	thinking	that	laws	govern	properties	and	their	instances,	then	there	are	strong	reasons	to	accept	the	view	that	properties	are,	in	some	sense,	powerful.	Hence,	we	claim	that	properties	should	be	taken	to	be	(in	a	thin	sense)	powerful,	for	otherwise	laws	cannot	play	their	governing	role.11	To	remind	the	reader,	we	argued	in	section	4	that	none	of	the	main	versions	of	LP	has	the	resources	to	address	the	Governing	Problem.	The	primitivists	decline	to	answer	the	question	of	what	makes	certain	properties	apt	to	be	related	nomically	by	specific	nomic	relations;	but	then	their	general	account	of	laws	remains	unilluminating.	ADT-theorists,	by	taking	properties	to	be	amodal,	make	it	difficult	to	understand	how	they	can	be	governed	by	laws	at	all;	and	this	is	the	reason	why	it	is	hard	to	understand	how	ADT-laws	issue	in	the	actual	regularities	of	the	world.	Thus,	we	take	it	that	commitment	to	properties	having	some	modal	force	is	a	necessary	condition	for	a	solution	to	the	Governing	Problem.		What	would	be	a	sufficient	condition?	Recall	that	minimally	powerful	properties	enter	into	nomic	relations	and	this	constitutes	laws	that	govern	the	relevant	powers	and	their	instances.	The	governing	can	be	thought	of	(conceptually)	as	a	two-step	process.	First,	by	being	powerful	(even	if	minimally),	properties,	necessarily,	enter	into	
																																																						11	The	view	that	powers	are	thin	is	compatible	with	various	accounts	about	the	nature	of	properties;	for	example,	properties	can	be	pure	(thin)	powers	or	powerful	qualities.	In	adopting	DM,	we	are	not	committed	to	any	such	specific	view	about	properties,	as	such	a	view	would	require	independent	arguments	that	we	leave	for	another	occasion.	
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nomic	relations	that	are	consistent	with	their	powers.	It	is	a	fact	about	the	actual	world	that	some	properties	tend	to	go	together	while	others	do	not.	Positing	minimal	powers	explains	why	certain	properties	are	apt	to	be	related	by	specific	nomic	relations:	it	is	because	properties	have	minimal	powers	that	they	tend	to	go	together.	Hence,	properties	are	governable	by	laws	because,	due	to	their	thin	powers,	they	tend	to	enter	into	specific	nomic	relations.	But	that’s	not	enough	for	governing,	since	the	nomic	relation,	which	relates	the	thin	powers,	is	external	to	its	relata.	How	then	do	nomic	relations	‘tell’	properties	what	to	do?	The	second	step	then	is	to	think	of	nomic	relations	themselves	as	relata-specific:	nomic	relations	relate	specific	properties12.	Hence,	nomic	relations	are	second-order	relata-specific	relations.	For	instance,	the	nomic	relation	associated	with	Newton’s	gravitational	law	links	two	masses,	the	force	acting	on	each	of	them	and	their	spatial	distance	(and	cannot	link	other	properties/relations).	Newton’s	law	governs	the	behaviour	of	mass	through	this	relata-specific	second-order	relation.	Of	course,	focusing	on	only	one	nomic	relation	is	an	oversimplification.	In	fact,	since	properties	are	usually	relata	of	a	number	of	different	nomic	relations,	it	is	the	network	of	relata-specific	nomic	relations	constituting	the	causal/nomic	role	of	the	property	that	governs	its	behaviour;	nothing	metaphysically	more	informative	could	be	said	about	this	governing.	Simply	put,	to	nomically	govern	a	property	(qua	a	thin	power)	is	simply	to	determine	the	specific	form	of	the	second-order	relata-specific	relations	that	this	property	bears	to	other	properties13.		 Here	is	an	objection	to	this	point.	Consider	Coulomb’s	law.	It	is	a	force	law,	which,	like	the	gravitation	law,	embodies	an	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation	but	it	relates	charges	instead	of	masses.	Intuitively,	the	‘inverse-square-of-the-distance’	nomic	relation	is	the	same	in	the	two	laws,	the	only	difference	being	that	the	relata	are	different.	Do	we	want	to	say	that	these	two	laws	embody	the	same	nomic	relation	with	different	relata?	In	that	case,	however,	nomic	relations	cannot	be	relata-specific.	This	objection	presupposes	that	nomic	relations	should	be	metaphysically	construed	as	‘function-like’	entities	with	‘slots’	to	be	filled	by	properties.	So	for	instance,	the	kind	‘inverse-square-of-the-distance’	nomic	relation	has	the	form	F	=	(slot	1).(slot	2)/r2	where	specific	properties	(masses,	charges)	are	substituted	for	the	slots.	There	are	two	ways	to	reply	to	this	objection.	The	first	is	to	note	that	even	if	we	granted	the	existence	of	slots,	it	would	still	not	follow	that	the	slots	would	necessarily	be	undifferentiated;	some	of	them	could	be	‘sensitive’	to	the	nature	of	the	properties	that	can	fill	them.	So,		Newton’s	gravitational	law	and	Coulomb’s	electrostatic	law	are	both	inverse-square	dynamical	laws	(they	have	the	same	functional	form),	but,	nevertheless,	we	could	say	that	the	nomic	relations	associated	with	those	two	laws	were	different.	This,	in	turn,	means	that	a	nomic	relation	is	inter	alia	sensitive	to	the	nature	of	its	relata	and	that	fact	
is	revealed	by	its	relata-specificity.	In	effect,	this	answer	rejects	the	foregoing	intuition:	
																																																						12	As	Weiland	and	Betti	(2008)	note,	the	relata-specificity	of	first-order	relations	can	explain	the	unity	that	characterises	first-order	states	of	affairs.	Perhaps	then	the	relata-specificity	of	second-order	nomic	relations	can	explain	the	unity	of	nomic	facts.	13	In	order	to	avoid	misunderstandings,	we	should	make	clear	that	according	to	the	dualist	model	(whose	main	 tenets	we	outline	here)	 laws	do	not	govern	 the	behaviour	of	properties	via	 their	 [i.e.	properties’]	powers.	If	that	were	the	case,	then	the	proposed	model	would	not	be	explanatorily	superior	to	LP	theories	regarding	the	Governing	Problem	because	it	(like	LP	accounts)	would	also	invite	the	question	of	how	laws	manage	to	govern	properties	which,	 in	this	case,	are	or	have	(thin)	powers.	 In	our	view,	however,	 laws	govern	properties	by	having	as	ontological	constituents	relata-specific	nomic	relations.	Nevertheless,	thin	powers	are	needed	to	ensure	properties’	nomic	governability,	that	is,	properties’	capability	to	enter	into	nomic	relations.	
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laws	which	involve	a	nomic	relation	with	the	same	functional	form	are	different	if	the	relata	are	different.		Alternatively,	we	could	modify	the	criterion	of	relata-specificity	in	order	to	respect	the	foregoing	intuition,	viz.	that	the	‘inverse-square-of-the-distance’	nomic	relation	is	the	same	in	the	two	laws,	the	only	difference	being	that	the	relata	are	different.	According	to	the	original	definition	of	relata-specificity	noted	above,	a	relation	R	is	relata-specific	iff	it	relates	unique	and	fully	specific	relata	as	soon	as	it	exists.	According	to	the	modified	account	of	relata-specificity	a	relata-specific	relation	need	not	relate	just	one	n-tuple	of	relata,	but	one	kind	of	relata	with	a	certain	thin	power,	e.g.,	attractivity.	If	that’s	plausible,	then	the	same	nomic	relation	(e.g.,	the	‘inverse-square-of-the-distance’	relation)	can	relate	distinct	properties	with	the	same	thin	power	(e.g.,	masses	with	masses	and	charges	with	charges).	A	plausible	view	about	the	‘relata-specificity’	of	a	nomic	relation	is	that	it	concerns	some	specific	thin	power	of	the	related	properties.	Mass,	for	instance,	may	have	the	power	to	attract	mass.	If	that	is	true,	then	mass	can	enter	into	relations	with	other	masses	in	such	a	way	that	its	attractive	power	is	manifested.	But	since	charges	have	also	the	power	to	attract	other	charges,	there	is	no	reason	not	to	suppose	that	the	actual	nomic	relation	which,	contingently,	relates	masses	with	distance	and	force	is	the	same	as	the	relation	which,	contingently,	relates	charges	with	distance	and	force.		We	don’t	have	to	commit	ourselves	to	one	of	the	two	replies	to	the	slot	objection,	because	for	us	the	important	point	is	that	whatever	view	is	adopted	the	laws	do	not	become	metaphysically	necessary.	Whichever	way	we	think	of	relata-specificity,	if	a	relation	is	relata-specific	and	holds	between	P	and	Q	in	the	actual	world,	it	holds	between	P	and	Q	in	all	possible	worlds	in	which	the	relation	exists,	but	not	necessarily	in	any	possible	world	in	which	P	and	Q	exist,	or	in	any	possible	world	whatsoever.	The	relata	of	a	relata-specific	relation	exist	independently	of	the	relation.	So,	the	relata	need	not	be	related	by	the	specific	nomic	relation.	That	is,	there	are	possible	worlds	in	which	the	relata	exist	yet	the	nomic	relation	does	not.	Hence,	nomic	relations,	qua	relata-specific,	are	metaphysically	contingent.	Hence,	the	laws	are	metaphysically	contingent.	But	at	the	same	time,	the	relata,	having	certain	thin	powers,	can	enter	into	certain	kinds	of	relations.	Consider,	for	instance,	the	second-order	fact	that	is	Newton’s	gravitation	law.	This	fact,	in	the	actual	world,	involves	the	property	of	mass	and	the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	nomic	relation.	Given	that	mass	has	only	a	thin	power,	masses	could	relate	to	each	other	by	different	nomic	relations;	but	given	that	mass	does	have	this	minimal	power	to	attract	other	masses,	they	would	necessarily	be	related	by	a	certain	‘attractive’	kind	of	relation.	The	nomic	fact	that	is	Newton’s	gravitation	law	must	involve	a	nomic	relation	between	specific	thin	powerful	properties.	In	a	different	possible	world,	the	nomic	relation	(the	inverse-square-of-the-distance	relation)	could	be	different,	but	given	that	it	involves	masses	in	the	actual	world,	and	masses	have	minimal	power,	the	law	would	be	an	attractive	one.	We	may	summarise	our	account	in	a	series	of	short	answers	to	four	important	questions.			First,	how	do	laws	govern	properties?		Answer:	a	law	governs	a	specific	property	by	having	a	constituent—a	nomic	relation—which	determines	the	specific	form	of	the	second-order	relation	that	this	property	bears	to	other	properties.			
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Second,	why	does	a	nomic	relation	relate	(and	hence	govern)	the	properties	that	it	actually	relates	and	not	others?		Answer:	because	it	is	by	its	own	nature	relata-specific.			Third,	why	should	properties	have	(or,	be)	thin	powers?		Answer:	because	they	must	have	a	minimal	modal	nature	in	order	to	be	apt	to	be	related	by	nomic	relations.			Fourth,	why	should	one	accept	DM	given	that	it	is	less	parsimonious	compared	to	monistic	views	such	as	dispositionalism	or	primitivism?		Answer:	while	parsimony	is	certainly	a	virtue	in	metaphysics,	less	parsimonious	views	are	to	be	preferred	to	the	extent	that	they	solve	problems	that	more	parsimonious	alternatives	are	not	able	to	solve.	We	have	argued	that	this	is	in	fact	the	case	for	all	main	monistic	accounts	that	accept	either	laws	or	powers,	but	not	both,	as	fundamental	elements	in	ontology.	So,	while	less	parsimonious,	the	richer	ontology	of	DM	enables	it	to	offer	an	account	of	the	ontology	of	laws	that,	we	claim,	it	is	more	consonant	with	the	scientific	image	as	revealed	by	current	science,	and	the	metaphysical	picture	that	underpins	it,	than	any	of	its	monistic	rivals.			 This,	then,	is	in	broad	outline	the	metaphysically	deflationary	view	we	associate	with	DM.14	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	to	develop	a	complete	account	of	laws	of	nature	as	understood	by	DM.	The	important	point	to	note	here	is	that,	in	contrast	to	current	monistic	views	about	laws	(such	as	PL	and	LP),	we	take	it	that	the	very	idea	that	laws	govern	worldly	regularities	requires	a	commitment	to	both	laws	and	powers	as	distinct	and	irreducible	elements,	which	indispensably	contribute	to	fixing	the	nomological	structure	of	the	world.	According	to	DM,	the	specific	behaviours	of	things	in	the	world	are	the	outcome	of	both	the	thin	powers	things	have	to	be	subjected	to	laws,	and	certain	nomic	features	of	the	world	(including	symmetries	and	conservation	laws).	So	the	motto	of	DM	is:	no	laws	and	(thin)	powers	in,	no	(governing)	laws	out.		 		
6	Other	Accounts	that	Combine	Powers	and	Laws	DM	is	not	the	only	theoretical	proposal	that	tries	to	combine	modal	properties	and	laws.	In	order	to	further	strengthen	the	plausibility	of	DM,	let	us	in	this	last	section	examine	some	such	recent	accounts.	Since	our	focus	is	on	governing	laws	we	will	not	discuss	those	views	that	suggest	that	we	can	combine	realism	about	modal	properties	with	versions	of	regularity	theory	of	non-governing	laws	(see	Vetter	(2015,	289–290)	and	Demarest	(2017)).		Kistler	(forthcoming)	thinks	that	powers	and	laws	together	play	the	metaphysical	role	of	making	true	disposition	attributions.	He	takes	it	that	the	justification	of	his	view	is	that	it	offers	the	best	way	to	make	sense	of	what	science	says	about	the	dispositions	of	objects.	In	particular,	Kistler	argues	that	laws	are	indispensable	in	making	sense	of	what	science	tells	us	about	dispositions	for	two	reasons:	first,	laws	are	required	to	explain	the	structure	of	the	dispositions	corresponding	to	one	power	and	to	make	sense	of	the	systematic	relations	between	the	dispositions	of	different	powers.	And	second,	laws	provide	the	relational	part	of	the	truthmaker	of	a	disposition	ascription	which	
																																																						14	The	suggested	account	 is	metaphysically	deflationary	 in	 the	sense	that	 it	does	not	posit	a	sui	generis	governing	relation.	It	is	important	to	stress	that	the	discussion	concerns	the	governing	of	the	behaviour	of	properties,	 not	 of	 objects.	 The	 latter	 is	 intimately	 related	 to	 (or	 even	 identified	 with)	 the	 relation	 of	necessitation	of	natural	regularities	by	laws	(see,	for	example,	Hildebrand	2013).	
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cannot	be	offered	by	monadic	powers.	For	Kistler,	laws	must	be	ontologically	robust	for	them	to	be	truthmakers.	One	way	to	fulfil	this	requirement	is	to	think	of	laws	(as	Kistler	does)	as	B-internal	relations	between	properties,15	that	is,	internal	relations	whose	relata	are	partly	or	wholly	constituted	by	their	entering	into	these	relations.		Kistler’s	account	seems	to	be	akin	to	the	dualist	model	since	both	powers	and	laws	are	required	to	metaphysically	explain	the	dispositions	of	objects.	Yet,	secunda	facie,	this	is	not	the	case	because	Kistler	adopts	neutral	monism	about	properties;	that	is,	he	thinks	that	the	categorical/dispositional	distinction	is	not	ontological	and	refers	to	different	ways	of	conceiving	and/or	describing	natural	properties.	The	term	‘power’	refers	according	to	Kistler	to	any	property	that	is	a	partial	truthmaker	for	a	disposition	ascription.	Kistler’s	neutral	monism	is	the	basis	for	our	main	worry	about	his	position.	It	is	true	that	according	to	both	his	view	and	the	dualist	model	natural	properties	and	laws	are	needed	to	explain	the	order	that	characterises	the	actual	world.	Our	model,	however,	can	metaphysically	explain	the	need	for	laws;	since	natural	properties	are	by	their	nature	modally	too	thin	to	do	the	explanatory	job	by	themselves,	laws	are	required	to	provide	the	‘missing’	modality.	We	cannot	see,	however,	how	Kistler’s	account	can	metaphysically	explain	the	indispensability	of	laws.	In	line	with	his	neutral	monism,	he	cannot	say	that	natural	properties	have	a	dispositional	or	categorical	or	‘mixed’	nature.	Hence,	it	is	an	ontological	brute	fact16	that	they	are	only	partial	truthmakers	of	the	disposition	ascriptions.	Scientific	practice	shows	that	laws	are	an	indispensable	element	of	any	adequate	explanation	of	the	behaviour	and	the	dispositions	of	objects,	but	there	is	nothing	in	Kistler’s	neutral	monistic	account	that	could	metaphysically	explain	that.			In	contrast	to	Kistler,	Tugby	holds	that	properties	have	a	powerful	nature.	In	his	(2016),	he	defends	the	indispensability	of	governing	laws	in	the	framework	of	a	power-based	ontology.	According	to	Tugby,	the	motivation	to	discuss	seriously	the	role	of	substantial	nomic	relations	in	a	powers	ontology	is	that	the	relational-constitution	view	about	powers	is	structurally	similar	to	the	ADT	view	as	far	as	the	governance	of	the	behaviour	of	concrete	things	is	concerned.	More	precisely,	in	both	views	second-order	relations	between	property	types	help	to	explain	the	behaviour	of	propertied	things.	Of	course,	the	difference	is	that	the	second-order	relations	between	power	types	are	internal	and	necessary,	whereas	ADT	nomic	relations	are	external	and	contingent.	Yet,	the	latter	fact	would	have	an	impact	on	the	similarity	between	the	views	only	provided	that	the	nomic	relations	between	power	types,	qua	internal,	were	no	additions	of	being.	Tugby	argues,	however,	that	qua	B-internal,	nomic	relations	are	metaphysically	robust	(2016,	1152).	So,	in	Tugby’s	view,	power	theorists	face	their	own	inference	problem	and	in	order	to	solve	it	they	have	to	investigate	the	role	of	second-order	nomic	relations	between	powers	in	the	governance	of	concrete	things.	Tugby	argues	that	power	types	are	Platonic	entities	which	are	essentially	constituted	by	B-internal	second-order	nomic	relations.	The	latter,	though	necessary	and	internal,	are	external	to	the	concrete	things	because	a)	qua	Platonic	are	capable	of	uninstantiated	existence,	and	b)	the	first	order	states	of	affairs	which	are	their	instances	ontologically	depend	on	them	and	not	vice	versa.	For	Tugby,	this	kind	of	externality	is	a	necessary	condition	for	these	relations	to	govern.	Now,	power	types,	though	capable	of	uninstantiated	existence,	are	often	instantiated	by	concrete	things.	Tugby	defends	an	
																																																						15	Here	we	follow	Barker’s	(2009)	terminology	for	the	different	kinds	of	internal	relations.	16	Kistler	argues	that	since	the	ascription	of	a	disposition	is	a	relational	fact,	its	truthmaker	should	have	a	relational	part	(which,	for	him,	is	the	law).	The	ontological	structure	of	a	truthmaker,	however,	does	not	have	to	mirror	the	structure	of	its	associated	truth.		
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account	of	instantiation	as	a	kind	of	ontological	dependence;	in	particular,	as	a	non-spatial	constituency	relation.	Hence,	for	him,	power	instances	are	first-order	states	of	affairs	which	have	as	essential	non-spatial	constituents	their	associated	power	types	(2016,	1160).	The	latter	have	independent	existence,	but	they	can	still	be	constituents	of	their	instances.	Given	all	that,	the	‘inference	problem’	for	powers	is	‘solved’	because:	a)	power	types	can	be	multiply	instantiated	and,	so,	many	things	can	have	as	a	constituent	the	same	power	type	and	consequently	have	the	same	dispositions	(2016,	1157),	and	b)	power	instances	(due	to	their	ontological	dependence	on	the	associated	power	types)	inherit	their	‘directedness’	for	specific	manifestations	from	the	relations	their	power	types	bear	(2016,	1158).		Compared	to	our	view,	Tugby’s	notion	of	governance	concerns	the	behaviour	of	concrete	things	and	consequently	it	is	related	to	the	‘traditional’	inference	problem.	Our	Governing	Problem,	however,	concerns	the	behaviour	of	properties	(that	is,	the	determination	of	their	nomic/causal	role).	Tugby	does	not	examine	the	Governing	Problem	as	we	understand	it,	but	given	what	he	says	about	the	inference	problem	it	is	natural	to	think	that	his	‘solution’	to	our	Governing	Problem	would	be	that	properties	are	thick	powers	whose	very	essence	includes	the	nomic	relations.	Without	taking	into	account	the	various	difficulties	Platonism	in	general	faces,	Tugby’s	approach	to	the	Governing	Problem	would	be	explanatorily	adequate	provided	that	all	nomic	relations	can	somehow	be	associated	with	the	essences	of	particular	powers.	But	if	our	previous	arguments	are	sound,	this	is	not	true.						Let	us	finally	focus	on	the	views	recently	presented	by	Dumsday	(2019).	Dumsday	(2019)	offers	the	following	argument	for	the	view	that	realism	about	modal	properties	implies	nomic	realism	(he	calls	it	Nomic	Dispositionalism):		
Premise	1	At	least	some	dispositions	have	ceteris	paribus	(cp)	clauses	incorporating	uninstantiated	universals	(which	cp	clauses	help	to	delimit	the	range	of	manifestations	of	those	dispositions).	
Premise	2	If	at	least	some	dispositions	have	cp	clauses	incorporating	uninstantiated	universals	(which	cp	clauses	help	to	delimit	the	range	of	manifestations	of	those	dispositions),	then	laws	of	nature	exist.	
Conclusion	Therefore	laws	of	nature	exist.	(2019,	11-12)		The	basic	idea	behind	Dumsday’s	argument	(expressed	in	premise	2)	is	that	for	the	realist	about	modal	properties,	cp	clauses	that	involve	uninstantiated	universals	are	(better,	express)	laws.	Hence,	if	the	realist	about	modal	properties	needs	to	posit	cp	clauses,	then	the	conclusion	follows:	there	exist	governing	laws.		More	precisely:	the	identity	conditions	of	dispositions	associated	with	modal	properties	consist	in	their	stimulus	and	manifestation	conditions,	including	any	cp	clauses.	At	least	some	dispositions,	however,	have	cp	clauses	that	include	uninstantiated	universals	in	the	sense	that	they	include	either	uninstantiated	values	of	an	instantiated	type	of	universal	or	‘alien’	properties	never	found	instantiated	in	our	world	but	whose	instantiation	is	possible.17	So,	the	uninstantiated	universals	(pure	abstracta)	figuring	in	
																																																						17	What	determines	this	possibility?	The	dispositional	nature	of	modal	properties	or	 independent	 laws?	What	 kind	 of	 possibility	 is	 this?	 If	 it	 is	 physical,	 we	 probably	 have	 a	 circularity	 here.	 Alien	 properties	should	 be	 physically	 possible	 in	 order	 to	 figure	 in	 cp	 clauses	 but	 the	 latter	 delimit	 the	 range	 of	disposition-manifestation	 and	 so,	 according	 to	 power	 realists’	 own	 lights,	 determine	 the	 physically	possible	events.	
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cp	clauses	help	to	delimit	the	range	of	possible	disposition-manifestations	and	function	as	(at	least	partial)	truthmakers	for	various	counterfactuals	concerning	the	manifestations	of	those	dispositions.	Therefore,	they	contribute	to	the	fact	that	events	in	our	world	must	take	place	in	certain	ways	rather	than	others.	Dumsday	(2019,	14)	explains:	“If	an	uninstantiated	value	of	positive	charge	were	instantiated	in	entities	possessing	mass,	then	where	those	entities	would	normally	undergo	a	gravitational	attraction	of	a	certain	force,	they	might	instead	be	repelled.	Or	if	an	alien	universal	were	instantiated,	the	‘normal’	disposition	manifestation	might	otherwise	be	disrupted.	Even	in	their	uninstantiated	state,	these	universals	serve	as	truthmakers	for	counterfactuals	involving	actual,	instantiated	dispositions.	This	counts	as	playing	a	governing	role	in	the	physical	universe,	in	the	relevant	sense…”.	Cp	clauses	then	‘include’	abstracta	determining	that	certain	events	can	or	cannot	take	place	under	particular	circumstances.	But	for	Dumsday	laws	are	properly	conceived	as	abstract	entities	somehow	playing	a	governing	role	in	the	physical	universe.	Hence,	cp	clauses	(by	incorporating	abstracta	that	do	exactly	that)	should	be	laws.			There	is	a	number	of	objections	about	nomic	dispositionalism	(ND),	some	of	which	Dumsday	himself	is	at	pains	to	meet.	The	first	objection	is	that	the	account	of	laws	given	by	ND	is	divorced	from	typical	scientific	usage.	According	to	ND,	laws	of	nature	are	not	what	scientists	typically	call	laws	but	are	instead	the	cp	clauses	figuring	in	the	identity	conditions	of	those	modal	properties	that	appear	in	scientific	laws.	Dumsday	(2019,	21)	admits	that	this	a	disadvantage	for	his	view	but	points	out	that	ND	is	closer	to	scientific	use	of	law-talk	than	traditional	realism	about	modal	properties	because	in	contrast	to	the	latter	it	allows	some	robust	governing	laws	to	exist.	This	response	is	hardly	adequate	because	the	problem	is	not	whether	ND	is	better	than	traditional	realism	about	modal	properties	but	rather	whether	cp	clauses	can	be	regarded	by	scientists	as	law-statements	(we	take	it	that	Dumsday	view	is	that	cp	clauses	are	law	statements	that	correspond	to	abstract	entities	that	govern).	For	scientists,	however,	the	typical	expression	of	a	law-statement	is	a	functional	relation	between	physical	properties	and	not	a	cp	clause.	So,	if	we	want	to	have	a	metaphysics	of	laws	that	is	friendly	to	scientific	practice	(as	Dumsday	advertises	his	view),	we	should	refrain	from	adopting	views	which	are	so	remote	from	what	scientists	believe	that	actual	laws	are.	This	is	then	a	main	difference	between	ND	and	the	dualist	model	that	strongly	counts	in	favour	on	the	latter,	since	in	DM,	governing	laws	have	exactly	the	form	of	laws	as	revealed	by	science.	A	second	objection	against	ND	is	that	cp	clauses	cannot	be	governing	laws	because	they	cannot	govern	the	behaviour	of	worldly	things.	The	reason	for	being	unable	to	govern	is	that	cp	clauses	are	existentially	dependent	on	their	associated	modal	properties	of	things	and	nothing	seems	to	be	able	to	govern	what	is	existentially	dependent	on.	The	existential	dependence	of	cp	clauses	is	due	to	the	fact	that	they	are	parts	of	the	identity	conditions	of	dispositions	associated	with	modal	properties	of	things	(2019,	15).	Dumsday’s	response	is	that	the	uninstantiated	universals	figuring	in	a	cp	clause	associated	with	a	modal	property	cannot	be	literally	constituents	of	an	
instance	of	that	property.	For	him,	what	is	really	happening	is	that	an	instance	of	a	modal	property	has	an	extrinsic	necessary	relation	to	these	universals	and	that	does	not	rule	out	that	one	relatum	of	the	relation	can	govern	the	other	one.	It	is	not	clear,	however,	whether	there	can	exist	a	governing	relation	between	different	levels	(the	type-level	of	uninstantiated	universals	and	the	token-level	of	property-instance)	that	is	not	the	instantiation	relation	(if	the	latter	exists).	And	even	if	we	skip	this	difficulty,	it	seems	that	Dumsday’s	response	fails	to	capture	what	the	objection	really	is.	For	cp	clauses	are	involved	in	the	identity	conditions	of	property-
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types	and	therefore	the	objector	does	not	claim	that	their	constituents	(that	is,	the	uninstantiated	universals)	are	literally	parts	of	property-tokens.	The	problem	of	course	remains	in	the	case	of	modal	property-types	whose	identity	involves	alien	universals.	How	can	the	identity	of	a	modal	property-type	be	determined	by	relations	to	universals	with	no	instantiations	at	all?	Dumsday	tracks	the	conceptual	space	of	possible	immanent-universalism-friendly	solutions	to	the	problem	albeit	with	intention	to	meet	the	above-mentioned	independence	objection.	But	he	admits	that	the	simplest	response	to	the	problem	is	to	embrace	platonic	realism	for	modal	properties.	However,	such	commitment	to	platonic	realism	about	universals	is	not	required	in	the	case	of	the	dualist	model,	which	can	remain	neutral	about	the	metaphysics	of	universals.	But	then,	DM	is	ontologically	more	minimal	than	ND	(as	well	as	Tugby’s	Platonic	Dispositionalism	mentioned	earlier),	and	thus	to	be	preferred.	A	final	objection	is	that	ND	relies	on	the	assumption	that	the	identity	of	modal	properties	depends	on	cp	clauses.	But	as	Tugby	(2016,	1149)	points	out,	some	philosophers	such	as	Bird	(2007,	60–65)	have	argued	that	the	identity	conditions	of	
fundamental	properties	do	not	involve	cp	clauses	because	it	is	impossible	(or	at	least	implausible	to	suppose)	that	there	are	interfering	factors	at	the	fundamental	level.	Hence,	if	at	least	some	modal	properties	are	fundamental	or	if	at	least	some	laws	relate	fundamental	modal	properties,	then	ND	fails	to	provide	an	adequate	metaphysical	account	of	all	laws.			
7	Conclusions	We	have	argued	that	neo-Aristotelian	accounts	that	take	powers	to	be	the	sole	source	of	natural	necessity	and	nomological	order	in	the	world	face	fundamental	difficulties,	stemming	from	their	inability	to	account	for	central	features	of	scientific	practice	and	theorising.	In	particular,	we	have	shown	that	powerful	but	lawless	ontologies	have	trouble	accounting	for	functional	laws	among	quantities,	conservation	laws,	symmetries,	as	well	as	the	role	of	counterlegals	in	scientific	practice.	We	have	thus	identified	a	fundamental	limitation	of	neo-Aristotelianism,	in	providing	an	ontology	based	solely	on	the	powers	of	worldly	entities	that	is	compatible	with	current	science.	However,	we	have	also	seen	that	alternative	lawful	but	powerless	ontologies	also	face	a	central	difficulty	in	clarifying	how	laws	can	govern	worldly	entities.		We	have	outlined	and	defended	a	new	approach—the	dualist	model—which,	we	have	argued,	is	a	novel	and	promising	candidate	for	providing	an	ontological	picture	that	is	in	conformity	with	current	science	but	at	the	same	time	metaphysically	illuminating.	In	this	dualist	model,	both	categories	(laws	and	powers,	suitably	conceived)	are	equally	fundamental	and	irreducible	to	each	other.	So,	DM	rejects	an	implicit	presupposition	in	most	current	philosophical	discussions	in	the	metaphysics	of	science,	i.e.	that	the	categories	of	laws	and	powers	are	mutually	exclusive	and	hence	that	a	metaphysics	of	nature	has	to	be	some	version	of	monism	and	take	the	form	either	of	PL	or	of	LP.					While	more	needs	to	be	said	for	a	full	articulation	of	the	ontology	associated	with	the	dualist	model	(which	we	leave	for	future	work),	we	think	we	have	done	enough	in	this	paper	to	motivate	DM	and	show	why	it	is	a	very	promising	candidate	for	providing	a	scientific	ontology	that	is	as	close	to	current	science	as	possible.	To	sum	up,	the	general	picture	emerging	from	DM	can	be	put	as	follows:	the	worldly	things	execute	the	laws	via	their	thin	causal	powers,	whilst	the	laws	determine	the	quantitative	relations	between	the	properties	of	worldly	things,	the	temporal	evolution	of	their	states	and	their	interactions,	as	well	as	global	features	of	the	world	(e.g.	conservation	principles).	
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DM	offers	a	third	way—a	via	media—which	recommends	an	ontology	that	is	both	lawful	and	powerful.	Our	claim	has	been	that	such	an	ontology	has	the	resources	to	solve	the	difficulties	encountered	by	its	two	dominant	competitors,	without	inheriting	the	problems	of	either	of	them.	Developing	a	metaphysically	adequate	account	of	how	laws	govern	worldly	entities	provides	thus	a	good	example	of	how	metaphysical	views	can	have	a	useful	role	in	our	attempts	to	offer	philosophically	satisfactory	accounts	of	the	current	scientific	image.		
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